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non-discriminatory mechanism on entry decision into account. We assert that the
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1 Introduction
This paper concentrates on regulated industries where the supply of final goods and
services to consumers requires the use of an essential input. An essential input may
be a facility or an infrastructure. It is used to enable competing firms to serve their
final customers and cannot be cheaply duplicated. Often essential facility constitutes a
bottleneck in the production chain. Examples of such bottleneck inputs are local loop
(telecommunications), transmission grid (electricity), pipelines (gas), tracks and stations
(rail transportation) and local delivery network (postal services).1 The owner of such
an input has incentives to use its dominant position to monopolize the complementary
segments of the market. Therefore, to introduce competition in some market segments of
these industries, for examples for long distance calls, electricity generation, gas extraction,
rail and freight services or the production of presorted mail, the competitors should be
granted access to the essential facility. Regulation of both the access conditions and the
access price is then of prime importance in these industries.
The economics of efficient access pricing (Laffont and Tirole 1994, Laffont and Tirole
2000, Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996) aim at deriving pricing schemes that maxi-
mize the total welfare and that guarantee that firms break even. This last point means
in particular that the owner of the essential input manages to cover all its cost with both
the access receipts and its downstream profit. The efficient access pricing approach pre-
scribes that, for each retail product, the associated Lerner index is inversely related to
the superelasticity of the product. This form of pricing is often referred to as Ramsey
pricing.
In this traditional approach, it is assumed that the regulator knows for all the market
segments which firms will operate. Consequently, Ramsey prices do not take into account
the impact of prices on the decision of firms to enter or not a particular segment of
the market. However, since the access price determines the overall profitability of firms’
downstream operations, it must have an impact on the entry decision of firms in those
situations where the market structure is not taken as given.
In this paper we analyze the impacts of access prices on the entry decision of a firm
in the market. We derive Ramsey prices when the regulator is unaware of the operating
cost of a potential competitor of the incumbent firm (which is the owner of the essential
facility). In our model, the regulator sets flat retail prices and access charge in order to
maximize social welfare. Consequently, the competitor’s decision of whether to enter the
market or not depends on the regulatory mechanism. A low access charge implies that a
firm is more likely to enter. The Ramsey prices corresponding to this situation are such
that the associated Lerner index for each retail product is inversely related to its modified
superelasticity. These modified superelasticities take into account the uncertainty over
the entry decision. For the products marketed by the entrant, there is an additional
1See Laffont and Tirole (2000, chapter 3).
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entry correction term in the Lerner index. Obviously, if entry always occurs, there is no
uncertainty over entry and our problem is equivalent to the traditional approach.
The main objective of this paper is to show how Ramsey prices should be adapted
when the market structure is not taken as given. To derive these optimal pricing schemes,
we make the following assumptions. First, we assume that the regulator has the power
to set the retail and access prices. This implies that the incumbent is totally passive: it
takes prices as given and supplies the quantities that exhaust the demand for its product
at these prices. The entrant is also passive with respect to its supply decision but it is
active with respect to its entry decision. The firm enters the market only if it can realize
a non-negative profit. If the demand for its product is positive, entry occurs if the entrant
realizes a non negative margin on its sales. Clearly, this depends both on its private cost
and on the regulated prices and access charge. Second, we assume that the regulator
cannot extract the entrant’s private information on its cost by using a menu of prices and
access charges. Hence, we consider a uniform pricing scheme that applies indifferently to
all types of the entrant. This is a source of inefficiency but it can be justified by the non-
discriminatory rule that a regulator often uses in designing access prices.2 What are the
exact implications of the non-discriminatory access requirement is beyond the objective
of this paper. The readers interested in this topic can consult the discussion in Laffont
and Tirole (2000, chapter 3), and Pittman (2004). Offering different self-selecting pricing
schemes is not per se a discriminatory practice since all firms have access to the same
pricing schemes. However, the German competitive authority (the Bundeskartellampt)
urged the owner of the rail infrastructure DB Netz to remove its TPS98 tariff for access
because it was considered as discriminatory. The TPS98 consisted of two different pricing
schemes: a two-part tariff for larger carriers and a per-unit access charge for smaller
carriers (see Pittman, 2004). We leave aside this discussion and derive Ramsey prices
when the regulator is bound to use flat prices and access charge.
The current model bears resemblance with few other earlier works in the literature on
access pricing. Lewis and Shappington (1999) consider mechanisms under price competi-
tion and asymmetric information where the entry decision is taken as given. Gautier and
Mitra (2003) consider an environment where the firms produce homogenous products and
compete sequentially in quantities. In their model, the market structure is endogenous
and they show that inefficient entry can occur, i.e., a more cost effective firm could not
enter the market or a less cost effective firm may enter the market. As an alternative to
Ramsey pricing, the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) prescribes that the access
price should be equal to the incumbent’s opportunity cost for the retail services. With this
type of access pricing, (a) potential entrants can enter profitably the market only if they
are more cost efficient and (b) entry is neutral with respect to the incumbent’s profit. In
2In the ongoing liberalization process in Europe, the European directives on telecommunica-
tion (90/388/EEC), electricity (96/92/EC), gas (2003/55/EC), rail (2002/14/EC) and postal services
(96/67/EC) impose that the essential facility owner grants access to competitors on the basis of a trans-
parent and non-discriminatory tariff.
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this approach, entry is endogenous and the market is always served by the most efficient
firm. Under some conditions the ECPR is equivalent to Ramsey pricing (see Laffont and
Tirole, 2000, Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996).
2 The Model
We consider an industry where two firms potentially operate in the downstream segments
of the market. The incumbent operator (I) produces two goods: a final good in quantity
xI and a network good. The potential entrant (E) produces a final good in quantity xE .
The two products are differentiated according to some quality parameters. Each firm uses
a unit of the network as an (essential) input to produce one unit of its final good. There
are two types of cost associated with this network input: a fixed cost k0 and a constant
marginal cost c0. The product of firm j involves a constant marginal cj for j = I, E. The
entrant pays a per unit price (the access charge) α for the use of the network.
The incumbent firm is either a duopolist (regime d) or a monopolist (regime m) in
the retail market depending upon whether E operates there or not. The demand for the
final goods/services at prices (pI , pE) faced by I is given by:
xI =
{
xdI(pI , pE), if E enters,
xmI (pI , pE), if E does not enter.
The monopolist’s demand depends on pE due to a possible existence of limit price. The
demand faced by E is xE = x
d
E(pI , pE). Let ηj and ηjk be the own and cross price
elasticities of xdj (for j, k = I, E), respectively, and let ǫI be the own price elasticity of
xmI . For a given pI , we have x
m
I (pI , .) ≥ x
d
I(pI , pE). A fraction of the consumers that
wishes to buy the product of E at price pE purchases from I at price pI when the entrant
stays out of the market. The gross consumer surplus from the downstream products is
given by U(xI , xE), where U is the indirect utility function. We assume that if firm j is
inactive, there are values of xj such that U(xj = 0, xk) > 0, for j, k = I, E.
The cost parameters (k0, c0, cI) of the incumbent firm are common knowledge. The
total costs that I incurs when it produces xI and its rival produces xE are given by
k0+c0(xI+xE)+cIxI . Entrant’s marginal cost cE is private information, and is distributed
according to a probability distribution function G(cE) on the interval [c, c¯]. Let g(cE) be
the continuous and differentiable density function associated with G(cE). The probability
distribution of cE is common knowledge and we assume that g(cE) > 0 for all cE .
We consider a fully regulated market where a utilitarian regulator sets the retail prices
pI and pE and the access charge α in order to maximise social welfare. We adopt the
account convention that the regulator receives the sales revenue of the incumbent and
makes monetary transfers to reimburse the costs of network. If E enters the market it
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pays the incumbent αxE for the use of the network good. Since the net utility of the
incumbent firm must be non-negative, the welfare maximisation problem induces prices
that are similar to Ramsey prices. In this environment, the only decision the potential
entrant takes is whether or not to supply the quantities xE(pI , pE) in the downstream
market.
Regulating retails prices in addition to the access conditions, is particularly important
when the firms are not competitive. Consider an entrant who possesses market power.
The regulator needs at least two instruments, namely, the retail prices (to regulate its
supply) and the access charge (to regulate its contribution to the network financing), with
both instruments having an impact on the entry decision.3 Had the entrant belonged to
a competitive fringe, only one regulatory instrument (say, the access charge) would have
been sufficient.
Laffont and Tirole (2000) analyze the case where the firms are competitive. In their
framework, the firms realise zero profit, and the regulator fixes only the access price.
Under symmetric information, the problem is similar to the above case where the regulator
fixes the retail and the access prices. This is no longer true under asymmetric information.
With competitive firms, E sets its price equal to its marginal cost: pE = cE + α, and
it enters the market if xdE(pI , pE = cE + α) > 0, i.e., entry occurs if there is a positive
demand for the product of E. If the regulator sets retail and and access prices, entry
occurs if the entrant realises a non-negative profit, i.e., if xE > 0 and (pE − cE − α) ≥ 0.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The timing of the event, which is summarised in Figure 1, is as follows. The entrant
learns its cost cE privately. Then the regulator sets pI , pE and α. After being offered the
mechanism (pI , pE , α), E decides on entry. If E decided to enter the market, each firm j
supplies in quantity xdj (pI , pE) for j = I, E. Otherwise, I supplies in quantity x
m
I (pI , .).
In the following sections we derive the Ramsey prices and the efficient access charge
both under symmetric (when E’s cost is known to the regulator) and asymmetric infor-
mation.
3 Pricing under Symmetric Information
In this section we assume that cE is publicly known. First we consider the case of a
duopoly market. The utilitarian regulator maximises social welfare by setting the retail
3Alternatively, the regulator can use a two-part tariff, where the variable part aims at regulating its
supply and the fixed part aims at regulating its contribution to the network financing. Gautier and Mitra
(2003), Lewis and Sappington (1996) use a two-part tariff to regulate the behavior of a non-competitive
entrant.
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prices (pI , pE) and the access charge α. We have mentioned earlier that, without any loss
of generality, we assume that the regulator reimburses costs, receives the sales revenue of
the downstream product of the incumbent, and that the entrant pays the access charge
αxE directly to the incumbent firm. The regulator makes a transfer t to the incumbent
for the provision of the network good. The utility level of the incumbent firm is then
t+ αxE . The profit of the entrant is given by (pE − cE − α)x
d
E . Public funds, which are
raised by distortionary taxes, have the shadow price 1 + λ (where λ > 0). Total funds to
be raised are given by:
t+
[
c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0
]
− (pI − cI)x
d
I .
The consumers’ utility is given by:
V d ≡ U(xdI , x
d
E)− pIx
d
I − pEx
d
E − (1 + λ)
(
t+ c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 − (pI − cI)x
d
I
)
, (CSd)
where U(xdI , x
d
E) is the gross surplus from consuming the downstream products, which is
assumed to be concave. Hence, the regulator sets pI , pE and α in order to maximise the
following social welfare:
W d ≡ U(xdI , x
d
E)−
[
c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 + cI)x
d
I + cE)x
d
E
]
−λ
[
t+ c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 − (pI − cI)x
d
I
]
,
subject to the participation constraints of the firms:
t+ α xdE ≥ 0, (PCI)
(pE − cE − α)x
d
E ≥ 0. (PCE)
Since public funds are costly, the participation constraint of the incumbent binds at the
optimum. Also, the access price α is set such a way in order that E earns zero profit.
Taking these facts into account the objective function of the regulator reduces to:
U(xdI , x
d
E)− (1 + λ)
[
k0 + (c0 + cI)x
d
I + (c0 + cE)x
d
E
]
+ λ(pIx
d
I + pEx
d
E).
The solutions to the above maximisation problem can be summarised as follows.
Lj ≡
pj − c0 − cj
pj
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ηˆj
, for j = I, E, (1)
where
ηˆj ≡
ηj(ηjηk − ηjkηkj)
ηjηk + ηjηjk
, for j, k = I, E.
The above expression ηˆj is the superelasticity of good j = I, E, which takes into account
the fact that the two firms sell differentiated products in the retail market. Under the
assumption of substitutability (ηjk > 0 for j, k = I, E) we have ηˆj < ηj . Further, the
Lerner index Lj of firm j is inversely related to its superelasticity.
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Next, consider the case of a monopoly market, i.e., the incumbent faces no rival in the
downstream segment of the market. In this case the total funds to be raised are given by:
t+ c0x
m
I + k0 − (pIx
m
I − cIx
m
I ) .
Hence, the net consumers’ surplus is given by:
V m ≡ U(xmI , 0)− pIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(t+ c0x
m
I + k0 + cIx
m
I − pIx
m
I ), (CS
m)
The utilitarian regulator designs the mechanism (pI , pE , α) to solve the following social
welfare:
Wm ≡ V m + t,
subject to t ≥ 0.
Again the net transfer t must be equal to zero for the participation constraint of the
incumbent to be binding. Hence the regulator’s objective function reduces to:
U(xmI , 0) + λpIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
m
I − (1 + λ)k0 ,
The solution to the above maximisation problem can be summarised as follows.
LI ≡
pI − c0 − cI
pI
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ǫI
. (2)
In this case the Lerner index of the monopolist is inversely related to the own price
elasticity of xmI .
Now we would like to see if, under symmetric information, entry is socially efficient.
In other words, we would look for a cut-off level of marginal cost of E such that if cE is
different from this cut-off level, maximum social welfare associated to duopoly is different
from that in the case of monopoly. This is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a level of marginal cost c∗ of E below which entry is always
socially optimal.
Proof Let W SI, d(cE) and W
SI,m be the maximum value functions of the above two
maximisation problems, respectively. Notice that W SI,m is independent of cE . Now by
Envelope theorem,
dW SI, d(cE)
d cE
= − (1 + λ)xdE
Given that λ ≥ 0 and xdE > 0, the above expression is strictly negative, i.e., W
SI, d(cE)
is strictly decreasing in cE. Now define c
∗ such that W SI, d(c∗) = W SI,m. Also, since the
function is strictly decreasing, we must have W SI, d(c) > W SI, d(c¯). Such c∗ exists under
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the assumption that W SI, d(c) ≥W SI,m ≥W SI, d(c¯).4 
In the next section we analyse the efficient pricing under asymmetric information, i.e.,
when the marginal cost of the entrant is not known to the regulator.
4 Pricing under Asymmetric Information
In this section we assume that E learns its marginal cost privately before the regula-
tor designs the mechanism (pI , pE , α), although the G(cE), the distribution of entrant’s
marginal cost is common knowledge. In this case the regulator maximises the sum of
the social welfare under each kind of market structure, namely duopoly and monopoly.
Notice that, after observing the regulatory mechanism, E makes the decision on entry.
It enters if ΠdE ≡ (pE − cE − α)x
d
E ≥ 0. Define cˆ such that pE − cˆ − α = 0. Given that
xdE(pI , pE) > 0, E enters only if cE ≤ cˆ. Thus, given the mechanism, cˆ, and hence the
market structure (duopoly or monopoly) are endogenous. Notice that with probability
G(cˆ) the market structure is a duopoly, and the incumbent is a monopolist with the com-
plementary probability. Under the assumption of unknown marginal cost, the regulator
then solves the following maximisation problem:
max
{pI ,pE ,α}
∫ cˆ
c
W d dG(cE) +
∫ c¯
cˆ
Wm dG(cE),
subject to
G(cˆ)(t+ αxdE) + (1−G(cˆ))t ≥ 0, (PC
AI
I )
α = pE − cˆ, (PC
AI
E )
The first constraint is the participation constraint of the incumbent, which implies that
the expected utility of I must be non-negative. Because public funds are costly, this
constraint binds at the optimum. The second constraint is the “zero-profit” condition
of the type-cˆ of E. As cˆ is endogenous the superelasticities must be modified in order
to take the impact of the mechanism on entry decision into account. Let us first define
the “modified superelasticities” for the retail products. Let the average demands be
x¯I = G(cˆ) x
d
I + (1 − G(cˆ)) x
m
I and x¯E = G(cˆ) x
d
E , respectively. Thus we can also define
average elasticities as follows.
η¯j = −
∂x¯j
∂pj
pj
x¯j
, for j = I, E,
η¯jk =
∂x¯j
∂pk
pk
x¯j
, for j, k = I, E, and j 6= k.
4We might have WSI,m > WSI, d(c). In this case one may choose c∗ = c, and hence entry is never
efficient. On the other hand, if WSI, d(c¯) > WSI,m we can choose c∗ = c¯, and hence entry is always
efficient. But we concentrate on the most interesting case where c∗ ∈ (c, c¯).
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Now we define the following modified superelasticities:
ηˆGj =
η¯j (η¯j η¯k − η¯jkη¯kj)
η¯j η¯k + η¯j η¯jk
, for j, k = I, E, and j 6= k.
Notice that the above modified superelasticities are similar to that in case of symmetric
information. Under unknown cost, the terms ηj and ηjk in ηˆj are replaced by η¯j and
η¯jk, respectively. The modified superelasticities depend on the entry decision of E (since
it depends on G(cˆ), the number of cost types that enter the downstream market). In
the following proposition we show that the modified superelasticity of a firm j can be
expressed as a weighted sum of ηˆj and its value at G(cˆ) = 0.
Proposition 2 The modified superelasticity of the product of each firm can be written
in the following way.
(a) ηˆGI = qI ηˆI + (1− qI) ǫI ,
(b) ηˆGE = qE ηˆE + (1− qE) r ηE ,
where
qI ≡
G(cˆ)(ηE + ηIE)
x¯I(η¯E + η¯IE)
, qE ≡
G(cˆ)(ηI + ηEI)
x¯I(η¯I + η¯EI)
and r ≡
ǫI
ǫI + ηEI
.
Proof First, notice that η¯I and η¯IE can be expressed as follows.
η¯I =
G(.)xdI
x¯I
ηI +
(1−G(.))xmI
x¯I
ǫI ,
η¯IE =
G(.)xdI
x¯I
ηI .
Also notice that η¯E = ηE and η¯EI = ηEI . Substitute the above in the formulas of ηˆ
G
I and
ηˆGE to get the results. 
From the above proposition it is easy to see that ηˆj can be obtained by evaluating ηˆ
G
j
at cˆ = c¯, i.e., in the case where the optimal mechanism is such that all cost types of E
can enter the retail market profitably. Also, since the products are substitutes (η¯jk > 0)
we have ηˆGj < η¯j for j = I, E. Also it is very easy to see that ηˆ
G
I is monotone in the
probability of entry, G.5 This fact is summarised in the following proposition and in
Figure 2.
Proposition 3 For ǫI > (<) ηI , ηˆ
G
I is monotonically decreasing (increasing) in the prob-
ability of entry.
5Similar conclusion can be drawn also for the entrant firm.
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Proof It is easy to check that, given ηjk > 0, ǫI > (<) ηI is a necessary and sufficient
condition for
∂ηˆG
I
∂G
< (>) 0. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 2 notice that ηˆI < ηI and ηˆ
G
I < η¯I , since the goods are imperfect substitutes.
Now we analyse the welfare maximisation problem when the marginal cost of E is un-
known. In the following proposition we describe the pair (pI , pE) as part of the optimal
mechanism. These prices are modified Ramsey prices which takes the endogeneity of the
market structure into account. They are efficient in the sense that they maximise social
welfare.
Proposition 4 The optimal retail prices are given by:
LI ≡
pI − c0 − cI
pI
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ηˆGI
,
LE ≡
pE − c0 − cE
pE
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ηˆGE
+Q(cˆ) ,
where Q(cˆ) ≡ 1
pE(1+λ)
(λ(cˆ− cE)− (E[cE|cE ≤ cˆ]− cE)) with E being the expectation op-
erator.
Proof See Appendix B. 
The Lerner index of the incumbent is similar to that derived in the symmetric infor-
mation case. This is inversely proportional to the modified superelasticity of its product.
When the marginal cost of E is private information, a similar regulatory mechanism fails
to perfectly regulate entry. Hence, LI depends on G(cˆ) through the modified superelas-
ticity. We have already established that ηˆGI can be expressed as an average of ηˆI and
ǫI . This implies that for G(.) = 1 and G(.) = 0, we can obtain LI equivalent to that in
equations (1) and (2), respectively.
In case of E, its Lerner index is a sum of two terms. First, it involves a modified
Ramsey term implying that LE is inversely related to ηˆ
G
E . Second, since the entry decision
of the firm cannot be perfectly regulated, there is an additional “entry correction” term.
This depends on the difference between cˆ and the true realisation of cE , and the difference
between “expected type” that enters in equilibrium and the true realisation of cE.
The optimal access charge α is determined from the remaining first order condition
of the maximisation programme. Firm E decides to enter after observing the mechanism
(pI , pE , α). All cost types of the entrant with marginal cost cE ≤ cˆ enter since these
types earn non-negative profits. Hence, the optimal mechanism influences cˆ, which is
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consequently determined endogenously from the condition: α = pE + cˆ. Using this, the
optimal access charge can also be written as the following:
α− c0
α + cˆ
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ηˆGE
+Q(cˆ) .
In the standard models of efficient access pricing as in Laffont and Tirole (2000), when the
cost of the entrant is unknown to the regulator, this firm is offered a menu of contracts
(pI(cE), pE(cE), α(cE)). Consequently, entry and hence the market structure are perfectly
regulated. There is no entry decision per se made by E. In the above mentioned models
the mechanism (pI(cE), pE(cE), α(cE)) is efficient in the sense that it maximises social
welfare for a given market structure. On the other hand, the “efficient component pricing
rule”, which is based on contestable markets, is concerned with efficient entry. In the
current model, we set up a model similar to Laffont and Tirole (1994) in order to derive
welfare maximising retail and access prices that also take efficient entry decision into
account. Our optimal mechanism gives rise to modified Ramsey prices.
5 Entry and Social Optimum
Now we analyse how does the entry decision, or equivalently cˆ, compare with the socially
optimal entry level. In other words, we would like to see whether, under asymmetric
information, there is inefficient entry compared to the social optimum. There are two
possible forms of inefficiency: “excess entry” under asymmetric information if cˆ > c∗, and
“too little entry” if cˆ < c∗.
In a related work, Gautier and Mitra (2003) find that (a) under asymmetric informa-
tion entry is generically inefficient and (b) that both types of inefficiencies are possible.
Thus, there is no systematic bias toward any particular form of inefficiency. In more
specific contexts i.e., using specific assumptions on the distribution of the entrant’s cost
parameter, Gautier (2006) and Bloch and Gautier (2006) identify situations where one
type of inefficient entry is not possible. Gautier (2006) observes that there is too little
entry with both two-part and single tariffs for the access charge, the latter generating
more entry. Bloch and Gautier (2006) study the choice between access and bypass as a
function of the regulated access price. They identify a situation where, under asymmetric
information, excessive bypass is possible, while excessive access does not emerge.
In our model, the cut-off entry point cˆ is found by solving the first order condition
of the maximisation problem in Section 4. As it clearly appears in this condition, the
entry cut-off depends on the distribution of the entrant’s cost parameter. Therefore,
two different distributions are likely to generate two different cut-off points and entry is
presumably not always efficient.
We can however identify a situation in which the cut-off entry point is identical under
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both symmetric and asymmetric information. As a matter of fact, if for all possible values
of cE , under symmetric information a duopoly is associated with a lower welfare level than
a monopoly, there will be a total entry ban under symmetric information.
Proposition 5 If c∗ ≤ c, then cˆ = c
Beyond that, we cannot identify a systematic bias in the entry decision. The following
numerical examples illustrate this point. In order to see this we consider (inverse) demand
functions for the retail goods of the following form:
pj = 1− x
d
j −
xdk
2
, for j, k = I, E, and when there are two firms,
pI = 1.1− x
m
I , when there is only the incumbent,
With the above demand functions the gross consumer surplus under duopoly and monopoly
are respectively given by:
U(xdI , x
d
E) = (x
d
I + x
d
E)−
1
2
(
(xdI)
2 + (xdE)
2
)
−
1
2
xdI x
d
E ,
U(xmI , 0) = 1.1 x
m
I −
1
2
(xmI )
2.
We further assume that λ = 0.2, c0 = 0, cI = 0.12, and k0 = 0.01. In what follows, we
consider two examples (two different sets of values of the parameters) in order to compute
c∗ and cˆ. Under asymmetric information, if we consider that cE is uniformly distributed
on the interval [c, c] i.e., g(cE) =
1
c−c
, different boundaries for this interval would generate
different cut-off points inducing both types of inefficiencies.
Example 1 The marginal cost of E, cE is distributed uniformly over [0.15, 0.20]. In
this case the efficient entry point under symmetric information is given by c∗ ≃ 0.18. And
the cut-off point under unknown marginal cost is given by cˆ ≃ 0.17. In this case there is
“too little entry”.
Example 2 Now assume that cE is distributed uniformly over [0.15, 0.25]. The effi-
cient entry point under symmetric information is given by c∗ ≃ 0.18. But the cut-off
point under unknown marginal cost is given by cˆ ≃ 0.22. In this case there is “excess
entry”.
From the above two examples we see that there is no clear ranking between c∗ and cˆ.
The first example suggests that, under asymmetric information, there is insufficient entry
compared to the social optimum. On the other hand, in the second example we find that
there is excess entry into the downstream market compared to the socially optimum level.
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6 Concluding Remarks
When the regulation of a potential entrant with unknown cost is under consideration,
traditional Ramsey pricing formula does not take into account the impacts of regulatory
mechanisms on the entry into the retail market. On the other hand, popular competition
policies assert that access to essential inputs should be non-discriminatory (i.e., a common
access fee for all types of users of the network facility). In this paper we show that a non-
discriminatory mechanism has significant impact on the entry decision of the rival firm.
We consider a regulatory environment where the retail prices and the access charge are set
by a utilitarian regulator. The derivation of efficient access and retail prices must make
use of a modified Ramsey pricing rule, which takes the impact of the mechanism on entry
into account, instead of the traditional one. Hence, given the regulatory mechanism, the
entry into the downstream market, and hence the market structure are endogenous. These
depend crucially on the non-discriminatory regulatory mechanism in which the regulator
cannot perfectly control the entry into the retail market.
In the current paper we first show that efficient retail and access prices under sym-
metric information coincide with the traditional Ramsey prices as derived in Laffont and
Tirole (1994). Next, in the case where the entrant’s cost is unknown, the efficient retail
and access prices are modified Ramsey prices. In this regard we derive modified supere-
lasticities of the retail goods which take the impact of the regulatory mechanism on the
entry decision into account. Finally, we show that, under asymmetric information, there
might occur “excess” or “too little” entry compared to the social optimum, i.e., there is
no systematic bias towards any particular type of inefficient (due to private information)
entry decision.
The above analyses are done under the assumption that the potential entrant posseses
market power instead of being part of a competitive fringe. When the entrant is assumed
to be competitive, one could draw conclusions that are similar to the ones found in the
current paper. An interesting extension of the current model would be to consider a
partially regulated industry where the regulator only designs the access fee (possibly a
two-part tariff), and the firms compete in a Bertrand fashion in the downstream market.
References
[1] Armstrong, M., C. Doyle and J. Vickers (1996), “The Access Pricing Problem: A
Synthesis”, Journal of Industrial Economics 44 (2): 131-150.
[2] Bloch, F. and A. Gautier (2006), “Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector”.
Mimeo, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics.
13
[3] Gautier, A. (2006) “Network Financing with Two-part and Single Tariffs”, in R.
Dewenter and J. Haucap (Eds), Access Pricing: Theory and Practice, Elsevier, forth-
coming.
[4] Gautier, A. and M. Mitra (2003), “Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility”,
CORE Discussion Paper Number 2003/84.
[5] Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (1994), “Access Pricing and Competition”, European
Economic Review 38, 1673-1710.
[6] Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (2000), Competition in Telecommunications, MIT Press.
[7] Lewis, T. and D. Sappington (1999), “Access Pricing with Unregulated Downstream
Competition”, Information Economics and Policy 11, 73-100.
[8] Pittman, R. (2004), “Russian Railroad Reform and the Problem of Non-
Discriminatory Access to Infrastructure”, Annals of Public and Cooperative Eco-
nomics 75, 167-192.
14
-
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t
E learns its
cost privately
Regulator sets
prices and access
charge
E decides
to enter
Supply decision
by firms
Figure 1: Timing of Events
15
-6
0 1
ηˆI
ǫI
ηI
ηˆGI
η¯I
Figure 2. 1: Modified Superelasticity of xI when ǫI > ηI
G
-
6
0 1 G
ǫI
ηˆI
ηI
ηˆGI
η¯I
Figure 2. 2: Modified Superelasticity of xI when ǫI < ηI
16
Appendix
A Pricing under Symmetric Information
When the marginal cost of the entrant is common knowledge, the regulator solves two
separate maximisation problems in order to design the optimal mechanism (pI , pE , α):
(a) when E enters the market, i.e., the retail market is a duopoly, and (b) when the
incumbent is a monopolist. First we consider the case of a duopoly market, where the
regulator maximises the following social welfare:
W d ≡ U(xdI , x
d
E)− pIx
d
I − pEx
d
E −
(1 + λ)
[
t+ c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 − (pI − cI)x
d
I
]
+
[t+ αxdE ] +
[
(pE − c0 − cE)x
d
E
]
,
subject to
t+ α xdE ≥ 0, (PCI)
(pE − cE − α)x
d
E ≥ 0. (PCE)
It is easy to check that, at the optimum, both the constraints are satisfied with equality.
If one incorporates these into the objective function, that reduces to:
U(xdI , x
d
E) + λ(pIx
d
I + pEx
d
E)− (1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
d
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cE)x
d
E − (1 + λ)k0 .
The first order conditions with respect to pI and pE are given, respectively by:
(pI − c0 − cI)
∂xdI
∂pI
+ (pE − c0 − cE)
∂xdE
∂pI
= −
λxdI
1 + λ
, (3)
(pI − c0 − cI)
∂xdI
∂pE
+ (pE − c0 − cE)
∂xdE
∂pE
= −
λxdE
1 + λ
. (4)
Let us define by
ηj ≡ −
∂xdj
∂pj
pj
xdj
and ηjk ≡ −
∂xdj
∂pk
pk
xdj
for j, k = I, E and j 6= k,
Lj ≡
pj − c0 − cj
pj
for j = I, E.
Equations (3) and (4) can be rearranged to give
Lj =
λ
1 + λ
1
ηˆj
, for j = I, E,
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where
ηˆj ≡
ηj(ηjηk − ηjkηkj)
ηjηk + ηjηjk
, for j, k = I, E.
The optimal access charge is given by:
α = pE − cE.
Now consider the case when the incumbent is a monopolist in the retail market. The
regulator then designs the mechanism (pI , pE, α) to maximise social welfare:
Wm ≡ U(xmI , 0) + λpIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
m
I − (1 + λ)k0 − λt,
subject to t ≥ 0.
The last inequality is the participation constraint of the incumbent, which binds at
the optimum. Hence, the objective function of the regulator reduces to:
Wm ≡ U(xmI , 0) + λpIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
m
I − (1 + λ)k0 .
The first order condition with respect to pI is given by:
(pI − c0 − cI)
∂xmI
∂pI
= −
λxmI
1 + λ
. (5)
Let us define by
ǫI ≡ −
∂xmI
∂pI
pI
xmI
.
Equation (5) can be rearranged to give
LI =
λ
1 + λ
1
ǫI
.
The above is the standard “inverse elasticity” rule of a monopoly firm. Notice that the
Lerner indices of the firms are inversely related to the superelasticities in duopoly.
B Pricing under Asymmetric Information
When the marginal cost of the entrant is unknown to the regulator he designs a mechanism
(pI , pE , α) in order to maximise the expected social welfare. Firm E decides to enter
the market after observing the mechanism. We have already mentioned that all cost
types of E that earn non-negative profits will enter the market. Define cˆ such that
pE − cˆ − α = 0. Hence, any type cE ≤ cˆ will enter the market. Thus with probability
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G(cˆ) the market structure is a duopoly, and the incumbent is a monopolist with the
complementary probability. Hence, the social welfare in this case is given by:
Wˆ ≡
∫ cˆ
c
W d dG(cE) +
∫ c¯
cˆ
Wm dG(cE)
=
∫ cˆ
c
[U(xdI , x
d
E)− pIx
d
I − pEx
d
E − (1 + λ)
(
t+ c0(x
d
I + x
d
E) + k0 − (pI − cI)x
d
I
)
+
(t+ αxdE) + (pE − cE − α)x
d
E] dG(cE)+∫ c¯
cˆ
[U(xmI , 0)− pIx
m
I − (1 + λ)(t+ c0x
m
I + k0 + cIx
m
I − pIx
m
I ) + t] dG(cE).
When the market is a duopoly, the utility of I is t+ αxdI , and it is t in case of monopoly.
The regulator designs the optimal mechanism that guarantees non-negative expected util-
ity to I (the participation constraint of this firm). Hence, the utilitarian regulator solves
the following maximisation problem:
max
{pI ,pE ,α}
Wˆ ,
subject to
G(cˆ)(t+ αxdE) + (1−G(cˆ))t ≥ 0, (PC
AI
I )
α = pE − cˆ, (PC
AI
E )
Notice that for the regulator choosing α is equivalent to choosing cˆ = pE −α. Now define
by
Wˆ d ≡ U(xdI , x
d
E) + λ pI x
d
I + λ pE x
d
E −
(1 + λ)(c0 + cI)x
d
I − (1 + λ)(c0 + cˆ)x
d
E − (1 + λ)k0 ,
and H(cˆ) ≡
∫ cˆ
c
G(t)dt.
The participation constraint of the incumbent binds at the optimum. Incorporating both
the constraints into the objective function, we can reduce the regulator’s problem as
follows:
max
{pI ,pE ,α}
G(cˆ)Wˆ d + (1−G(cˆ))Wm + xEH(cˆ).
Also define x¯I ≡ G(.)x
d
I +(1−G(.))x
m
I and x¯E ≡ G(.)x
d
E . The first order conditions with
respect to pI , pE and cˆ are given, respectively by:
(1 + λ)
[
(pI − c0 − cI)
∂x¯I
∂pI
+ (pE − c0 − cˆ)
∂x¯E
∂pI
]
+ λx¯I +H(cˆ)
∂xdE
∂pI
= 0, (6)
(1 + λ)
[
(pI − c0 − cI)G(cˆ)
∂xdI
∂pE
+ (pE − c0 − cˆ)
∂x¯E
∂pE
]
+ λx¯E +H(cˆ)
∂xdE
∂pE
= 0, (7)[
Wˆ d −Wm
]
− λ xdE h(cˆ) = 0, (8)
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where h(.) is the hazard rate associated to the distribution function G(.), which is assumed
to be monotonically increasing. Rearranging equations (6) and (7) we get
LI ≡
pI − c0 − cI
pI
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ηˆGI
,
LE ≡
pE − c0 − cE
pE
=
λ
1 + λ
1
ηˆGE
+Q(cˆ) ,
where
ηˆGj =
η¯j (η¯j η¯k − η¯jkη¯kj)
η¯j η¯k + η¯j η¯jk
, for j, k = I, E, and j 6= k.
and Q(cˆ) ≡
1
pE(1 + λ)
(λ(cˆ− cE)− (E[cE|cE ≤ cˆ]− cE)
=
1
pE(1 + λ)
[
λ(cˆ− cE)−
(
H(cˆ)
G(cˆ)
− cE
)]
.
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